Share holding Pattern and Firm Performance by Jayesh Kumar
Share holding Pattern and Firm Performance
Jayesh Kumar
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai.
jayesh@igidr.ac.in
Abstract
Corporate Governance deals with the issue of how suppliers of nance to corporations
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Several Studies have examined
the relationship between ownership structure and rm performance. Using dierent data
samples most of the studies provide general support for the argument that increase in
managerial ownership increases rm performance. However, these results have been ques-
tioned recently.
This study examines empirically the eects of ownership structure on the rm performance
for a large sample of Indian Corporate Firms, from an `agency perspective'. We examine
the eect of interactions between corporate, foreign, nancial institutions, and managerial
ownership on rm performance. We provide empirical evidence, which suggests that rm
size and age in positively related to the rm performance. Using panel data framework,
we show that a large fraction of cross-sectional variation, in rm performance, found in
several studies, is explained by unobserved rm heterogeneity, rather than the ownership
structure. We do not nd any evidence that the dierences in ownership structure, aect
rm performance; after controlling for observed rm characteristics and rm xed eects.
Keywords: corporate governance, share holding pattern and rm performance.
1 Introduction
Corporate Governance is the system of control mechanisms, through which \the supplier
of nance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment,''
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The classical problem lies within the separation of ownership
and control, i.e. the agency cost resulting from a divergence of interest between the owners
and the managers of the rm (Jensen and Meckling 1976).Researchers have extensively studied the conict between managers and owners regarding
the nature of the rm. In Berle and Means (1932), authors claim that with an increase
in professionalization of management, rms might be operating for the managers' benet
rather than that of the owners.
The principal-agent framework is used by Jensen and Meckling (1976), to explain the
conict of interests between managers and shareholders. The agency problem, developed
by (Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen and Meckling 1976) is an essential part of the contrac-
tual view of the rm. A rich empirical literature has investigated the ecacy of alternative
mechanisms in terms of the relationship between takeovers, performance, managerial pay
structure and performance of the rm. A rather small literature has attempted to test
directly Berle and Means hypothesis. The empirical evidence on this point is mixed.
Using US data from early 1930s, Stigler and Fridland (1983) found no evidence in favor
of Berle and Means hypothesis. Similarly, using recent data, Demsetz and Lenn (1985),
found no relation between rm performance, and ownership concentration. While Ahuja
and Majumdar (1998), Chibber and Majumdar (1998: 1999), Khanna and Palepu (2000),
Majumdar (1998a: b), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Mork et al. (1988), Patibandla
(2002) and Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) found a signicant relation between rm value and
ownership concentration.
These ndings have recently been questioned by Agrawal and Knober (1996), Him-
melberg et al. (1999) and Habib and Ljungquist (2000). They did not nd any evidence
for the relationship between rm value and managerial stock-holdings, and conclude that
managerial stock-holding are optimally chosen over the long run.
Some of the issues addressed in this study have also been analyzed with Indian data in
some recent studies by Ahuja and Majumdar (1998), Chibber and Majumdar (1998: 1999),
Khanna and Palepu (2000), Majumdar (1998a: b), Patibandla (2002), Sarkar and Sarkar
(2000), ? and Douma et al. (2002).
Chibber and Majumdar, analyze the relation between foreign ownership and company
performance, using the accounting measures (ROA and ROS). Khanna and Palepu (2000)
examine the rm performance of group vs. stand-alone rms. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000)
examine the rm performance with relation to eective monitoring by owners of companies
using a spline specication. However, all the above-mentioned studies have tried to look
into the question using a cross-section data where the unobserved rm heterogeneity can
not be controlled and their results may be time specic.
Our work continues along these lines of enquiry: it explores the link between rm
performance and share-holding pattern in a panel of 530 publicly traded Indian Corporate
2Firms over the years from 1990 to 1999. Its contribution is two-fold. First, we employ an
econometric framework (Panel Data) that specically controls for rm specic unobserved
heterogeneity and aggregate macro-economic shocks. Second, it uses exact share-holdings
by dierent groups of owners, controlling for change in rm value due to small change
in share-holding pattern (not exactly changing the dominance of a group), as in most of
the cases share-holding pattern do not change dramatically. Our results document that
no group of owners conrm to Berle and Means hypothesis after controlling for rm-xed
eects and along with some factors that may inuence rm's economic performance. Our
results also demonstrate that even after controlling for rm-xed eects some rm specic
controls, such as age, size, advertising intensity, export intensity, marketing intensity and
import intensity have signicant eect on rm performance. However, in the absence of
rm-xed eects, we do nd evidence in favor of the eect of share-holding pattern on
rm performance.
1.1 Hypothesis
The hypothesis postulated here is that, in contrast to (Chibber and Majumdar 1998: 1999,
Majumdar 1998a: b, Sarkar and Sarkar 2000), share holding pattern does not lead to a
signicant relationship between performance and ownership structure, as the optimal
ownership structure is chosen over time.
H1: Firm performance is unrelated to the percentage of shares held by
dierent group of investors.
Firm performance may depend on managers' knowledge about the market, consumers
and its reputation in the market. Which is in relation to learning by doing arguments,
suggesting rms age may be one of the determinants of the performance. But with
increasing age rms may be reluctant to employ the changes in technology or managerial
structure leading to lower performance which is treated as `rigidity eect'. It may yield a
negative relation between performance and age. Which leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: Firm performance is positively related to its age.
Large rms may have positive benets, as they may have better penetration in the mar-
ket (input as well as output), compared to the smaller rms. They may exercise economies
of scale. Large size enables greater diversication and specialization, on the other hand it
makes the managers task more dicult due to increased coordination requirements. From
the perspective of governance, the highly skilled managers are associated with the larger
rms, therefore larger rm's performance should be higher (Ahuja and Majumdar 1998,
Das 1995).
3H3: Firm performance is positively related to size.
If, as is hypothesized here, a positive relationship exists between size, age and rm per-
formance and no relationship exists between rm performance and ownership structure,
the presence of large share holders holders would be expected to moderate the hypothe-
sized positive relationship between age and size with rm performance.
1.2 Data sources and Sample selection
For our study of eects of ownership structure (share-holding pattern) on rm perfor-
mance, in emerging market, we focus our attention on Indian Corporate Sector. The
rm level panel data for our study is primarily obtained from the corporate database
(PROWESS) maintained by CMIE, the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The
data used in the analysis consists of all manufacturing rms listed on Bombay Stock
Exchange (BSE), with the data on required control variables along with share holding
pattern.
Public Sector rms are not included in the analysis as their performance is inuenced
by a large number of social obligations, which may be much complex to account for. Firms
within nancial services segments are removed form consideration, because applying our
valuation method to them, is problematic, as earnings before interest and taxes are not
meaningful for nancial companies.
We conne our analysis to BSE listed rms only because all the listed rms are required
to follow the norms set by Securities and Exchange Board of India(SEBI) for announcing
the nancial accounts. The BSE also has the second largest number of domestic quoted
companies on any stock exchange in the world after NYSE, and more quoted companies
than either London or Tokyo.
We analyze data from 1990 to 1999, as this is the period for which we have the most
coverage in the database. Also, during the 1990's India went for liberalization, allowing
diversied share-holding pattern of Corporate rms. There are 530 rms in our nal
sample, for which we have required data of at least 3 consecutive years.
We restrict our analysis to rms which have no missing data (on sales, age, share
holding pattern, return and assets ) for at least 3 consecutive years 1. There are 530 rms
spread over 3-10 years, resulting in an unbalanced panel of 2,251 rm years. Thus, we
avoid exacerbating the scope for sampling bias by not requiring a balanced panel.
For this unbalanced panel of 2,251 observations, we collect the following additional
1We drop observations, where values reported for capital stock, sales and age are missing, zero or negative.
We can not avoid these conditioning because we can not use rms with observations fewer than 3 continuous
years of data in our methodology.
4data for each rm observation: advertising, distribution, depreciation, marketing, imports,
exports, excise, capital and r&d expenditure. Despite the problem of attrition and missing
data , our sample provides several distinct advantages over the samples used in earlier
studies.
2 The Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence is based on the rm level panel data for 8 Indian Manufacturing
Industries over the period of 1990 to 1999, consisting of 2251 rm years.
Percentage share-holding of dierent investors (fore, i, corp, and dir) are correlated,
because, these shares, along with the shares of other top 50 shareholders and others not
included so far (which are not considered here) adds upto `100' and if one of them increases
then at least one of the others have to decrease. In order to avoid multi- collinearity, we
use only four main share-holders, i.e. fore, i, corp, and dir. We also use 1-digit 2-digit
and 3-digit level industry dummies, based on industrial classication of ASI-NIC' 1998
by NSSO (National Sample Survey Organization).
The results of our empirical analysis are reported in Tables thereafter 2.
Regression of ROA on a simple collection of rm-specic variables, a collection of
industry dummies along with time dummies, where the rm-specic variables include age,
age2, lsale, lsale2, adv int, mkt int, exp int, imp int, excise int, and rdum and fore, i,
corp, and dir. The regression, signicant at 5% level, is carried out on 2,251 observations,
for which the required data is available 3. The ownership variables show a positive eect
of fore, corp and dir and negative eect of i. This regression specication suggests that
rms with higher concentration of share-holdings by i, under perform. Using dierent
measures of size (such as sales or assets or logarithm of assets) do not change any of these
results qualitatively 4.
Age has a strong positive impact on rm performance. This may be because of various
reasons. First, although rms in mature as well as infant industries keep learning about
their own eciencies over time and nd their niches in the product market as they age,
the returns of such learning may be diminishing in a mature industry and increasing
in an infant industry. Second, in an infant industry, learning about the existence of
2We also perform several analysis to reinforce the choice of functional form. For example, we use MBVR
and PQ Ratio as another proxy for rm performance, as suggested by (Sarkar and Sarkar 2000). In due course
our sample size reduces, as the share price data is available only from 1996 onwards.
3The coecient estimates for the industry dummies are not reported.
4Inclusion of more controls or use of dierent spline specication for ownership variables, do not change
any of our results qualitatively. Which is also consistent with the results of (Sarkar and Sarkar 2000).
5the new product, by consumer may increase over the age of the producing rm, leading
to a positive impact on its performance. Third, with age a rm's reputation might be
enhanced. The managerial return from such reputation building may be high in an infant
industry, leading to a positive impact on rm performance.
These point estimates suggests that rm performance is not aected by dierent class
of share-holders and actually it is the unobserved rm-specic heterogeneity, which gets
reected in ownership variables, when we do not control for it. This result is similar to
the results of (Himmelberg et al. 1999) and suggests that the share-holdings are optimally
chosen. These results are in contrast to those obtained by several authors in the Indian
context, for example, (Chibber and Majumdar 1998: 1999, Gupta 2001, Khanna and
Palepu 2000, Patibandla 2002, Sarkar and Sarkar 2000). Using data of Indian rms they
have found a signicant positive relation between rm performance and concentrated
share-holdings by some class of owners.
A negative relationship of leverage with rm performance is found, which is in contrast
to the Western economies. It may be because in India, suppliers of debt are mainly
government-owned nancial institutions.
3 Conclusion
This study has examined empirically the relationship between the ownership structure and
rm performance. Four aspects of ownership have been considered : equity ownership by
dir, equity ownership by fore, equity ownership by i and equity ownership by corp. The
results presented, in this study suggests that, for Indian Corporate Firms, performance
and ownership is unrelated in the long run.
We nd that a large fraction of cross-sectional variation in share-holding pattern is
explained by unobserved rm heterogeneity. Suggesting, the unobserved heterogeneity
has important implications for econometric models, to estimate the eect of share-holding
pattern on rm performance. The results, do not provide any evidence of the eects of
ownership structure on the performance.
We conclude that the share-holding pattern does not inuence the rm performance
signicantly, and the agency problem is solved by the optimal ownership pattern in the
long run.
The results of similar studies on Indian data have produced contradictory results. It is
possible that the contradictory results can be accounted for by dierences in time periods
studied and in research design. Given the lack of previous work examining the eects
6Table 1: Formula for variables construction
roa (net prot+tax+interest+depreciation)/total assets
fore foreign holdings
dir directors and their relatives holdings
corp corporate bodies holdings
i government and nancial institutions
age years since the date of incorporation
lsale ln(sales)
lsale2 ln(sales)*ln(sales)
leverage tot borrowings/(equity capital+tot borrowings)
adv int advertising expenditure/sales
exp int total exports/sales
imp int total imports/sales
mkt int marketing expenses/sales
dis int distribution expenses/sales
exc int excise tax/sales
rd int R&D/sales
of ownership structure on performance of Indian Corporate Firms, with panel data, it
is dicult to make comparison between this and other studies. Some comparison can
be made with (Himmelberg et al. 1999) US study, which, is consistent with the present
study, found performance and ownership to be unrelated, hence suggesting ownership is
optimally chosen over the long run.
However, given the contradictory results produced by the current study and the prior
Indian Research, it is clear that there are many questions relating to the relationship
between share holding pattern and performance of the rm, which remain unsolved. There
remains the task of nding out the mechanisms for the determination of share-holding
pattern. One other useful extention of this analysis would be to include additional policy
variables measuring changes in the market conditions such as trade policy changes, to see
whether ownership structure changes dramatical or not, if so to what extent and why?
Do companies in emerging markets actually raise substantial equity nance? Who are the
buyers of this equity? If they are dispersed minority shareholder, why are they buying
equity despite the apparent absence of minority protections?
7Table 2: Regressions for ROA
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Group Dummy 1-digit 2-digit 3-digit Firm Level Firm Level
age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.021 -0.023
(0.7014) (0.3447) (0.3507) (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale 0.035 0.036 0.039 0.056 0.056
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
lsale2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
exp int 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.043 0.044
(0.4409) (0.1927) (0.4741) (0.1111) (0.1064)
imp int 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.2640) (0.3402) (0.1536) (0.3227) (0.3179)
dis int -0.002 -0.043 -0.076 -0.513 -0.521
(0.9730) (0.5277) (0.2522) (0.0022)** (0.0019)**
exc int 0.020 -0.016 -0.016 -0.203 -0.205
(0.4743) (0.6441) (0.6517) (0.0039)** (0.0036)**
rd int 0.032 -0.077 -0.010 0.108 0.110
(0.8237) (0.5265) (0.9349) (0.3332) (0.3171)
adv int 0.141 0.208 0.214 0.157 0.162
(0.2341) (0.0988)+ (0.0858)+ (0.3551) (0.3382)
mkt int -0.055 -0.109 -0.084 -0.163 -0.172
(0.4583) (0.1547) (0.2248) (0.1177) (0.1036)
k int -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.3332) (0.2555) (0.7967) (0.0002)** (0.0002)**
leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.4254) (0.5400) (0.6200) (0.7895) (0.7581)
fore 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0058)** (0.0319)* (0.0277)* (0.6493) (0.5431)
i -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0157)* (0.0041)** (0.0087)** (0.3154) (0.2775)
corp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.1255) (0.1716) (0.1514) (0.9811) (0.8921)
dir 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.1861) (0.5299) (0.2978) (0.1458) (0.1455)
Observations 2251 2251 2251 2251 2251
No.of groups 530 530 530 530 530
R-squared (within) 0.2936 0.2936 0.2936 0.2936 0.2920
Robust p values in parentheses
+ signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%
8References
A. Agrawal and C. Knober. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems
between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
31:pp.377{397, 1996.
Gautam Ahuja and Sumit K. Majumdar. An Assessment of the Performance of Indian
State-Owned Enterprises. The Journal of Productivity Analysis, 9:pp.113{132, 1998.
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
Larcourt, Brace & World Inc., New York (Republished:1968), 1932.
Pradeep K. Chibber and Sumit K. Majumdar. State as Investor and State as Owner:
Consequences for Firm Performance in India. Economic Development and Cultural
Change, 46,no.3:pp.561{580, 1998.
Pradeep K. Chibber and Sumit K. Majumdar. Foreign Ownership and Protability:
Property Rights, Control, and the Performance of Firms in Indian Industry. The
Journal of Law and Economics, XLII:pp.209{238, 1999.
Sanghamitra Das. Size, age and rm growth in an infant industry: The Computer hard-
ware Industry in India. International Journal of Industrial Economics, 13:pp.111{126,
1995.
Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lenn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences. Journal of Political Economics, 93,no.6:pp.1155{1177, 1985.
Sytse Douma, Rejie George, and Rezaul Kabir. Foreign and Domestic Ownership, Business
Groups and Firm Performance: Evidence from a Large Emerging Market. Titenburg
University Working Paper, 2002.
E. Fama and M. Jensen. Separation of Ownership and Control. The Journal of Law and
Economics, 26:pp.301{325, 1983.
Nandini Gupta. Partial Privatization and Firm Performance. William Davidson Institute
Working Paper:426, 2001.
Michel A. Habib and Alexander P. Ljungquist. Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A
Stochastic Frontier Approach. London Business School Working Paper, 2000.
9Charles P. Himmelberg, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Darius Palia. Understanding the Deter-
minants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance.
The Journal of Financial Economics, 53:pp.353{384, 1999.
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. The Journal of Financial Economics, 3:
pp.305{360, 1976.
Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu. Is Group Aliation Protable in Emerging Markets?
An Analysis of Diversied Indian Business Groups. The Journal of Finance, LV,no.2:
pp.867{891, 2000.
Sumit K. Majumdar. Assessing Comparative Eciency of the State Owned Mixed and
Private Sectors in Indian Industry. Public Choice, 96:pp.1{24, 1998a.
Sumit K. Majumdar. Capital Structure and Performance: Evidence from a transition
economy on an aspect of Corporate Governance. Public Choice, 98:pp.287{305, 1998b.
John J. McConnell and Henri Servaes. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and
Corporate Value. The Journal of Financial Economics, 27:pp.595{612, 1990.
Randall Mork, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Management Ownership and
Market Valuation - An Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Financial Economics, 20:
pp.293{315, 1988.
Murali Patibandla. Equity Pattern, Corporate Governance and Performance: A Study of
Indian corporate Sector. Copenhagen Business School, Working Paper, 2002.
Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sarkar. Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance
in Developing Countries: Evidence From India. International Review of Finance, 1,no.3:
pp.161{194, 2000.
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal
of Finance, LII,no.2:pp.737{783, 1997.
George J. Stigler and Claire Fridland. The Literature of Economics: The case of Berle
and Means. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26:pp.237{268, 1983.
10